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States’ Rights and the Scope of the Treaty Power:      
Could the Patriot Act be Constitutional as a Treaty? 
SIMCHA HERZOG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Attorney General John Ashcroft defended the Patriot Act on Tuesday, 
saying that the anti-terrorism measure passed by Congress after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks has been key to the nation’s efforts to thwart attacks 
against Americans.”1  He said: “If we knew then [prior to September 11] 
what we know now, we would have passed the Patriot Act six months be-
fore September 11 rather than six weeks after the attacks . . . .”2  Further-
more, contrary to the assertions of the Act’s detractors, “the cause we have 
chosen is just [and] [t]he course we have taken is constitutional.”3 
Conversely, when the “FISA” Court4 reviewed sections of the Patriot 
Act, it reached a conclusion at odds with the Attorney General’s blanket 
assessment.5  The “FISA” Court held that “the Justice Department and FBI 
could not [constitutionally] take advantage of several key liberalizations of 
FISA included in the U.S.A. Patriot Act.”6  On appeal, however, the 
“FISA” Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the disputed sections of the Patriot Act.7 
  
     *   J.D. 2004, Fordham University, School of Law. Mr. Herzog is an associate in the law firm of 
Cohen Tauber Spievack & Wagner LLP.  He is the author of an article entitled “Applying the Incorpo-
ration Conundrum to the Second Amendment: Can States Infringe on the Individual Right to Keep and 
Bear?”  23 QLR 115 (2004). 
      1. CNN, Ashcroft Kicks Off Campaign to Defend Patriot Act, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW 
/08/19/ashcroft.patriot.act/index.html (accessed Apr. 24, 2005) [hereinafter CNN, Ashcroft Defends].  
The raison d'être of the Patriot Act is encapsulated in its heading: “Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) 
Act of 2001.”  Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 2. CNN, Ashcroft Defends, supra n. 1. 
 3. Id. (emphasis added).  For a brief overview explaining the rudiments of the Patriot Act, see 
CNN, Explaining the U.S.A. Patriot Act, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/23/patriot.act 
.explainer/index.html (accessed Apr. 24, 2005). 
 4. “FISA” is an acronym for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  The “FISA” Court of 
review is a special federal judicial panel that approves requests for wiretaps and searches in espionage 
and terrorism cases, to ensure the federal government’s compliance with the “FISA.”  CNN, No Way to 
Secure a Homeland?, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/26/time.homeland/index.html 
(accessed Apr. 24, 2005) [hereinafter CNN, No Way]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  Many of the provisions of the Patriot Act “take the form of amendments to” FISA.  A.C.L.U. 
v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 7. In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (U.S. For. Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. 2002).  
The case lacks a typical party name because the “FISA” Court “usually makes its rulings in secret.”  
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Consider the following hypothetical scenario: after an appeal by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court determines that the 
Patriot Act is unconstitutional.8  This decision so infuriates President Bush9 
that he seeks out the advice of his legal counsel in a frantic attempt to by-
pass the Court’s ruling.  After some research, President Bush’s legal advi-
sors give him two options: he can either attempt to pass an amendment to 
the constitution or, with the “advice and consent of the Senate,”10 he can 
sign the Patriot Act as a treaty with a foreign nation.  Either of these meas-
ures will evade the severity of the Court’s decision.  After some reflection, 
the President chooses the treaty method because the probability of ratifica-
tion is greater.11 
This hypothetical is not merely the fruit of an imaginative mind.  
Rather, it is a reconstruction of an event that actually occurred, albeit in 
quite a different context.12  During the early 1900s, the migratory bird 
population of the United States dwindled to the point of extinction.13  Con-
gress, in an attempt to forestall this outcome, began efforts to regulate 
  
CNN, No Way, supra n. 4.  This case only entered the public domain “at the bipartisan behest of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, worried about the perceived excesses of Bush’s anti-terror campaign.”  Id. 
 8. This is a serious possibility because the Patriot Act raises challenging constitutional questions.  
For example, the aforementioned cases and accompanying text raised the issue of whether the Patriot 
Acts’ amendments to “FISA” violate the Fourth Amendment.  See supra nn. 5-7.  Another major uncer-
tainty raised by the Patriot Act is its impact on states’ rights.  Thus far, three states and 181 cities have 
passed resolutions decrying the Patriot Act.  Ryan Geronimo, USA Patriot Act Lifts Lid Off Library, 
http://www.statehornet.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/10/08/3f8403121c1c3?in_archive=1 (accessed 
Apr. 24, 2005).  There are at least two areas where it could be argued that the Patriot Act violates 
states’ rights or the Tenth Amendment.  First, the Patriot Act requires state owned libraries to turn over 
information to the federal government.  Id.  Second, as Senator Patrick Leahy pointed out, the Patriot 
Act is being used for much broader purposes than merely fighting “terrorism,” and may violate a state’s 
right to combat crime as they see fit.  Sen. Patrick Leahy, Hearing On Protecting Our National Secu-
rity From Terrorist Attacks: A Review of Criminal Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=965&wit_id=2629 (accessed Apr. 24, 2005). 
 9. CNN, No Way, supra n. 4.  According to CNN, the decision in the “FISA” case “so riled the 
Bush Administration” that it loudly aired the subsequent appeal. 
 10. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  For a more extensive quote of this provision consult infra note 78 
and accompanying text. 
 11. The Constitution requires the agreement of either two thirds of both Houses or two thirds of the 
state legislatures, merely to propose an amendment.  Moreover, ratification only occurs if three fourths 
of the states or their conventions agree to pass the proposed amendment.  U.S. Const. art. V.  Alterna-
tively, the President’s signature and the “advice and consent” of the Senate, “provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur,” is all that is needed to hand to sign and ratify a treaty.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2.  Hence, the speed of enacting a treaty contrasted against the unlikelihood of a unanimous consen-
sus to pass a constitutional amendment, dictate that the President take the treaty path.  To illustrate the 
differences in speed, compare Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890) (the Court’s decision in Chisholm 
raised such an uproar that the Eleventh Amendment was proposed immediately thereafter and neverthe-
less took five years to be ratified), with infra n. 19 (the treaty was ratified after thirty minutes of de-
bate). 
 12. For a thorough discussion of the material contained in this paragraph, see David M. Golove, 
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty 
Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075, 1246-57 (2000) [hereinafter Golove, Treaty-Making]. 
 13. Id. at 1255. 
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these migratory birds.14  The Court, however, stymied Congress’ repeated 
efforts.15  According to the Court, Congressional regulation of wild game 
exceeded Congress’ commerce powers and hence infringed on powers 
reserved to the states.16  In an attempt to bypass the unconstitutionality 
inherent in any legislation regulating these birds,17 Senator Elihu Root sug-
gested that the treaty power be used to create “a situation . . . in which the 
Government of the United States will have [the] constitutional authority to 
deal with this subject.”18  This is in fact what occurred.  In 1916, the Wil-
son administration and the necessary majority of the Senate signed and 
ratified the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with Canada.19  Congress then en-
acted legislation regulating these birds to comply with the duties created by 
the treaty.20  The Court upheld this renewed attempt at bird regulation in 
the crucial case of Missouri v. Holland.21 
The Court’s holding in Missouri v. Holland is relevant today for two 
interrelated reasons.  First, the Court may determine that some sections of 
the Patriot Act are unconstitutional.22  If that occurs, under the reasoning in 
Missouri v. Holland, does the Constitution permit the President and the 
Senate to enact the Patriot Act as a treaty with a foreign country?  Second, 
at present, major human rights treaties languish in the Senate,23 while other 
treaties, although ratified, are nevertheless attached with significant reser-
vations,24 enabling the federal government to avoid changing its policies.25  
  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. E.g. Greer v. Conn., 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896) (holding that wild game within the territory of a 
state was held by the state in trust for its citizens). 
 17. Martin S. Flaherty, Part II: Are We to be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in 
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1297 (1999) (describing the federal government’s action as 
an “end run around this problem”). 
 18. Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1255 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 8349 (1913) (Senator 
Robinson quoting Senator Root)). 
 19. Id. at 1256 (“[T]he Senate approved the treaty after a thirty-minute debate.”); see also supra n. 
11 and accompanying text. 
 20. Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1256. 
 21. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 22. See supra n. 8.  Another relevant example that is currently making headlines is the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court’s ruling enabling gay marriage.  CNN, Massachusetts Court Rules Ban on Gay 
Marriage Unconstitutional, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/18/samesex.marriage.ruling/ 
index.html (accessed Apr. 24, 2005).  It is possible that the Supreme Court would agree, especially in 
light of Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (deeming unconstitutional a state law that made it a 
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct). 
 23. For a full discussion of these treaties see Barry Friedman, Federalism’s Future in the Global 
Village, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1441, 1464-65 (1994) (specifically reference nn. 148-50). 
 24. Id.  See also Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, 147 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon, 
& William D. Rogers eds., Transnational Publishers 1990) (Richard B. Lillich notes, in his essay enti-
tled “The Constitution and International Human Rights” that “the United States has ratified none of the 
five major United Nations-sponsored treaties it has signed.”). 
 25. Peter J. Spiro, Human Rights on the Eve of the Next Century: Aspects of Human Rights Imple-
mentation: The States and International Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 567, 572 (1997) (discuss-
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The Senate justifies these practices by indicating that it would be unconsti-
tutional to completely ratify the treaties at issue.26  Is this assessment cor-
rect? 
This article focuses on these vital questions.  Part II of this article ana-
lyzes the Court’s holdings in Missouri v. Holland27 and Reid v. Covert,28 
the other significant case in this area.  Part III scrutinizes the scope of the 
treaty power, based upon analysis of the constitution’s text, structure, and 
selected relevant legislative history.  Lastly, Part IV discusses the Court’s 
recent holdings supporting federalism, and analyzes the impact of the 
Tenth Amendment on the treaty power. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Can the United States be a party to a treaty that exceeds Congress’ or-
dinary legislative powers?29  Is the treaty power a means to bypass the lim-
ited, enumerated powers granted to the federal government by the Consti-
tution?30  The seminal case31 of Missouri v. Holland32 directly addresses 
these questions.  The issue in Missouri was whether the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act33 passed constitutional muster.  Congress previously enacted 
legislation similar to the treaty, in an attempt to confront the migratory bird 
problem,34 but two district courts35 held the statute as “beyond Congress’ 
  
ing the refusal of the federal government “to correct state practices which may violate international 
human rights”). 
 26. Id. at 575. 
 27. 252 U.S. 416. 
 28. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 29. Logistical constraints prevent this article from dealing extensively with “execu-
tive/congressional–executive agreements.”  The discussion herein focuses mostly on treaties.  It should 
be observed that the questions posed by this article apply, with even greater zest, to these agreements.  
Their constitutionality is based upon the pragmatism of the Court, as opposed to the clear text of the 
Constitution.  Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (noting that “it cannot be contended that . . . an [executive] agree-
ment rises to greater stature than a treaty”).  For a full discussion of these agreements and their consti-
tutional implications, see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 799 (1995) [hereinafter Ackerman, NAFTA]. 
 30. See e.g. U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1882) (explaining that “the government of the United 
States is one of delegated, limited, and enumerated powers”). 
 31. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution ch. V, 144 (The Found. Press, Inc. 1972) 
[hereinafter Henkin, Foreign Affairs].  According to Professor Louis Henkin, this case is “perhaps the 
most famous and most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs.” 
 32. 252 U.S. 416. 
 33. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000) (amending the Act to include treaties with Mexico, Japan, and Russia). 
 34. The problem was that these birds were of “great value as a source of food and in destroying 
insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protec-
tion.”  Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 35. U.S. v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); U.S. v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). 
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commerce powers.”36  The question before the Court therefore, was 
whether the President could, with the “advice and consent of the Senate,”37 
sign a treaty that would not be constrained by the limits of the commerce 
clause.38 
Missouri argued that the treaty39 unconstitutionally impeded on states’ 
rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.40  Furthermore, Missouri con-
tended that treaties cannot expand Congress’ constitutional powers, mean-
ing that the treaty power of the United States must be limited to Congress’ 
legislative powers.41  The Court, however, speaking through Justice 
Holmes, strongly disagreed with Missouri’s assertions.  Holmes explained: 
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth 
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United 
States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is 
delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the au-
thority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the 
supreme law of the land.42  Acts of Congress are the supreme law 
of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while 
treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the 
United States.43 
This line of reasoning ostensibly eviscerated both of Missouri’s argu-
ments.  First, the treaty power is entirely delegated to the federal govern-
ment.  Accordingly, the Tenth Amendment only reserves non-delegated 
powers to the states44 and cannot substantially limit the federal govern-
ment’s treaty power.  Consequently, the United States can sign a treaty that 
limits the rights of states, even though the treaty would be an unconstitu-
  
 36. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 423 
(1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power]. 
 37. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 38. James A. Deeken, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals?  The Impact of Federalism on Inter-
national Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. 
United States, 31 Vand. J. Transnatl L. 997, 1009 (1998) (noting that Missouri “raised the question of 
whether the federal government can act outside its Article I powers via international treaty”). 
 39. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432 (Actually the treaty in question was “non-self executing,” meaning 
that the question presented to the Court also addressed the constitutionality of the statute passed in 
accordance with the treaty.). 
 40. Id.  For the full text of the Tenth Amendment see infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 41. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432. 
 42. Id. (The Court noted that if a treaty is constitutional then “there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute under Article 1, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the 
government.”  Seemingly, the validity of a treaty determines the constitutionality of a statute made in 
accordance with that treaty.). 
 43. Id. at 432-33 (emphasis added). 
 44. See infra n. 119 and accompanying text (full text of the Tenth Amendment). 
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tional violation of the Tenth Amendment if legislated by Congress.45  Sec-
ond, a treaty–as opposed to legislation–is valid, assuming it is made under 
the authority of the United States.  Therefore, the allowable scope of a 
treaty is broader than the permitted scope of legislation, as the latter is fur-
ther limited by the Constitution.46 
Since the treaty power is both delegated and not bound by normative 
constitutional constraints, issues arise regarding whether any limits exist on 
the treaty making power.47  Justice Holmes did nothing to alleviate these 
concerns and insinuated that the only limits on the treaty making power are 
procedural; that is, it only requires the President’s signature and ratification 
by two thirds of the Senate.48  Even though Holmes did not explicitly say 
that there are no qualifications on the treaty making power,49 he did indi-
cate that such qualifications “must be ascertained in a different way.”50  
Thus, Missouri stands for two propositions: (1) the Tenth Amendment, or 
  
 45. See e.g. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-
Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515, 530 (1991) (arguing that 
“our constitutional law is clear: the treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to 
any subject, and notions of states’ rights should not be asserted as impediments to the full implementa-
tion of treaty obligations”); Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra n. 31, at 147 (contending that the Tenth 
Amendment does not provide any limits on the treaty power).  It should be noted that the Court took 
the Tenth Amendment seriously in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding that the 
Tenth Amendment prevented Congress from using the Commerce Clause to enact child labor preven-
tion laws).  Hence, the Missouri decision was not based upon the impotence of the Tenth Amendment, 
but rather its inapplicability. 
 46. Jay Loyd Jackson, The Tenth Amendment Versus the Treaty Making Power Under the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 14 Va. L. Rev. 441, 442 (1927-1928) (stating that Missouri “leaves the way 
clear for the courts to reach an unconstitutional result . . . through the colorable exercise of the treaty-
making powers”). 
 47. This question is comprised of two elements: First, can a treaty be made on any subject, that is, is 
there a limited scope inherent in the treaty power?  Second, does the Tenth Amendment or “states’ 
rights” have an impact on the treaty power?  See supra nn. 45-46 and accompanying text.  Although 
these elements are certainly related, Professor Bradley correctly notes that they are analytically distinct.  
It is possible that, even when the Tenth Amendment does not play a limiting role, the scope or subject 
matter of a treaty may be limited its wording.  Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 393.  Part III of 
this article focuses on the scope or subject matter aspect, while Part IV will address the “states’ rights” 
or Tenth Amendment facet.  It should be noted that these questions can be “mirror images of each 
other,” though not analytically and not in a practical sense in the treaty scenario.  N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 
144, 156 (1992) (explaining that “[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; [whereas] if a power is an 
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitu-
tion has not conferred on Congress”).  See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 393; Flaherty, supra 
n. 17, at 1282-85. 
 48. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433 (opining that a valid treaty may not require “more than [adherence to] 
the formal acts prescribed to make the convention”). 
 49. Before Missouri, the Court clearly held that the treaty power does not extend “to authorize what 
the Constitution forbids.”  Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).  Justice Holmes backed away 
from that position by offhandedly noting that the “treaty in question does not contravene any prohibi-
tory words to be found in the Constitution,” which indicates treaties are only limited procedurally.  
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 50. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. 
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“states’ rights,” does not affect the treaty making power; and (2) the le-
gitimate scope or subject matter of a treaty is enormous.  Therefore, after 
Missouri, unconstitutional legislation would likely pass muster under the 
rubric of the United States’ treaty making power.51 
Nevertheless, this colossal loophole was not used to bypass the arche-
typal limits of the Constitution and, by the early 1940s, “Missouri had been 
reduced to a[] historical footnote.”52  The Court’s upholding of New Deal 
legislation was a major factor in Missouri’s descent into obscurity.53  Since 
Congress could compel the states via the commerce clause, the treaty mak-
ing power became superfluous.54 
Missouri again rose to controversial prominence during the 1950s.55  
The United States began signing treaties56 that, under the authority articu-
lated in Missouri, were used to override inconsistent state laws.57  This 
concern prompted Senator Bricker to engage in a tumultuous seven-year 
crusade to overrule Missouri and limit the treaty power through constitu-
tional amendment.58  One reason the Bricker Amendment was not 
adopted59 was the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert.60  Justice 
  
 51. The commentators disagree as to whether Missouri sets any serious limits on the treaty making 
power.  See Flaherty, supra n. 17, at 1298 (agreeing that after Missouri, “treaties need only comport 
with the Constitution’s procedural rather than substantive requirements”); Jackson, supra n. 46 at 442 
(Missouri “leaves the way clear for the courts to reach an unconstitutional result . . . through the color-
able exercise of the treaty-making powers”); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Part II: Breard, Printz, and the 
Treaty Power, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1317, 1337 (1999) (arguing that Missouri suggests “that there might 
not be any substantive limits to the treaty power”); see also Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 
1083 (arguing that Missouri held “that treaties, like all other governmental acts, must be subject to the 
Constitution”). 
 52. Ackerman, NAFTA, supra n. 29, at 857. 
 53. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 399 (explaining that “[o]nce it became understood that 
the federal government had almost unlimited domestic lawmaking powers, the particular scope of the 
treaty power . . . became less relevant”); Ackerman, NAFTA, supra n. 29, at 857 (“[T]he New Deal 
revolution had swept away the principles of limited government that made Missouri seem important.”).  
 54. See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 399.  Furthermore, the scope of the treaty power 
became less relevant, since the Court had held the “executive/congressional-executive agreements” to 
be constitutional, see e.g. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937), and as such the more cumber-
some treaty power was no longer necessary. 
 55. Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1273-74. 
 56. Id. at 1274.  The United States adopted the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and began negotiations on an international human rights covenant. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  “At one point in 1954, the proposed [Bricker] amendment came within one vote of passage 
in the Senate.”  Id. at 1275. 
 59. Furthermore, President Eisenhower allayed the fears of some segregationists and helped thwart 
passage of the Amendment by announcing that he “had no intention of becoming a party to the then- 
proposed human rights treaties.”  Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 428.  For a comprehensive 
discussion of Bricker’s proposed amendment consult Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 12, at 1273-
78. 
 60. 354 U.S. at 22 (holding that citizens are shielded from prosecution in a military court formed in 
a treaty because it would be “inconsistent with both the ‘letter and spirit of the constitution’ ”); see also 
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Black, speaking for a plurality, held that no treaty61 could “confer power 
on the Congress, or on any other branch of government, which is free from 
the restraints of the Constitution.”62  Unlike Missouri, the Court in Reid 
argued that the treaty power is limited by 
[constitutional] restraints which are found in that instrument 
against the action of the government or of its departments, and 
those arising from the nature of the government itself and that of 
that of the States.  It would not be contended that it extends so far 
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the 
character of the government or in that of one of the States.63 
Justice Black continued: 
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who cre-
ated the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the 
Bill of Rights – let alone alien to our entire constitutional history 
and tradition – to construe Article VI as permitting the United 
States to exercise power under an international agreement without 
observing constitutional prohibitions.64 
Reid overturned provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
because those provisions did not conform to the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.65  Reid effectively limited the scope of the treaty making power 
when it held that no treaty may abridge an individual’s constitutional guar-
antees.66 
Accordingly, the Patriot Act would be improper as a treaty if it vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, the Tenth Amendment seems to 
impose a slight limitation on the treaty power67 because no treaty can be 
used to change the “character” of state government.68  Thus, if a human 
rights treaty were deemed to alter the “character” of a state government, by 
transforming its law enforcement system, it would be an unconstitutional 
violation of the Tenth Amendment. 
  
Deeken, supra n. 38, at 1009 (explaining how the Court’s decision “quieted fears that it [(the Court)] 
would allow international treaties to circumvent constitutional limits on the federal government”). 
 61. Justice Black disposed of the case by upholding “the supremacy of the Constitution over a 
treaty,” despite the fact that an executive agreement was at issue.  Id. at 16-17. 
 62. Id. at 16. 
 63. Id. at 17-18. 
 64. Id. at 17. 
 65. Id. at 39-40. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 17-18 (discussing the prohibition against changing the “character” of a 
state likely emanates from the Tenth Amendment and “states’ rights” concerns).  For an argument that 
the dicta in Reid repudiates this idea see Flaherty, supra note 17, at 1300. 
 68. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. 
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Nevertheless, these issues remain ambiguous.  The foremost reason for 
this ambiguity is that Reid was only a plurality opinion – meaning that 
Missouri is still good law.69  Furthermore, Justice Black adds to the confu-
sion by attempting to show how his plurality opinion is in consonance with 
Missouri, while unmistakably altering it.70  Lastly, the Court frames the 
limitations of the treaty power in ambiguous language, such that definitive 
principles are not easily ascertainable.71 
The Court has not revisited this issue since the Reid decision.72  There 
is a strong probability, however, that the Senate still believes that there are 
substantive limits on the treaty power.73  Moreover, since the Court has 
emphatically renewed its support of federalism,74 it may very well decide 
to re-examine its anti-states’ rights holding in Missouri.  Therefore, the 
next section of this article will analyze whether Missouri is correct, in its 
unspoken assertion that the scope of the treaty power is nearly unlimited. 
III.  SCOPE OF THE TREATY POWER 
Two camps have developed in the debate over the extensive scope of 
the treaty power: the “nationalist”75 faction and the “states’ rights” faction.  
The “nationalist” faction argues that there are no subject matter limitations 
  
 69. According to Professor Flaherty, a five-member majority of the Reid Court held that a treaty 
cannot violate the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Flaherty, supra n. 17, at 1300.  
Close consideration of Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Reid, arguably yields a different result.  
Frankfurter said: “I therefore conclude that, in capital cases, the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction 
over civilian dependents in time of peace cannot be justified . . . .”  Reid, 354 U.S. at 49 (emphasis 
added).  Seemingly, Frankfurter might agree with the plurality, but only in certain limited circum-
stances.  Thus, it is incorrect to say that a majority in Reid holds that treaties may not usurp an individ-
ual’s constitutional rights.  In fact, most commentators support the view that only a plurality in Reid 
held that treaties cannot abridge individual state rights.  See e.g. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 
425; Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1277. 
 70. For a discussion of these points see the text accompanying supra notes 60-68. 
 71. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (for example, the Court said: “To the extent that the United States can 
validly make treaties, the people and the states have delegated their power to the National Government 
and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier”) (emphasis added).  But the term “extent” is left undefined. 
 72. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 426. 
 73. Even when the Senate does ratify treaties it attaches a boilerplate set of reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations (“RUDs”) that include a statement to the effect that the federal government will 
only implement the treaty to the extent that it possesses the legislative and judicial power over the 
matter in question.  Id. at 428; see also supra nn. 24-25.  These RUDs manifest “a desire not to effectu-
ate changes to domestic law by means of the treaty-making power.”  David P. Stewart, United States 
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article: The Significance of the Reserva-
tions, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1183, 1206 (1993).  For a comprehensive 
discussion on the role of states in foreign affairs, see Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in 
Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Intl. L. 821 (1989); Friedman, supra n. 23. 
 74. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress 
from “conscripting” state officers to enforce a federal regulatory program). 
 75. Bradley, supra n. 36, at 393 (Professor Bradley coined this term in his insightful article.). 
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on treaties and that the Tenth Amendment plays no part in limiting trea-
ties.76  In contrast, the “states’ rights” faction argues that treaties are both 
limited in scope and limited by Tenth Amendment considerations.77  This 
section attempts to prove three things: (1) the Founders created the treaty 
power with limited scope; (2) changed circumstances created the dis-
agreement between the “nationalist” faction and the “states’ rights” faction 
over the scope of the treaty power; and (3) Missouri was not decided in 
accordance with the original understanding of the treaty power.  This part 
is, therefore, divided into three sections, all analyzing the treaty power.  
The first analyzes the constitutional text, the second examines the constitu-
tional structure, and the third considers some of the legislative history. 
A. Constitutional Text 
[The president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur . . . .78 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . 
.79 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land . . . .80 
The text of the Constitution seems to support the “nationalist” view.81  
Treaties, which are the “supreme law of the land,” are to be made only by 
the President with the “advice and consent of the Senate.”  States have no 
say when it comes to treaties.82  The text thus implies that the federal gov-
ernment can enact treaties on any subject.83  Moreover, the Constitution 
does not qualify the word “treaty”; specifically the Constitution does not 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 79. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 80. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 81. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra n. 31, at 137 (arguing that the text of the Constitution “does not 
expressly impose prohibitions or prescribe [subject matter] limits on the treaty power”). 
 82. See e.g. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (maintaining that state lines disappear in the area of foreign 
relations); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) (holding that states have no power in the 
area of foreign relations); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 78 (1824) (explicitly stating that “the states are 
unknown to foreign nations”). 
 83. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra n. 31, at 383 n. 33 (quoting William Rawle, who said that “in 
our present Constitution no limitations [on the treaty power] were held necessary”). 
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state that treaties must solely concern issues of a foreign nature.84  This 
further indicates that there is no subject matter restriction on treaties.  
Seemingly, treaties can cover any topic, including issues integral to the 
sovereignty of a state, such as fighting crime or the death penalty.85  Ac-
cordingly, it seems that the constitutionality of the treaty in Missouri was 
correctly upheld, despite having a significant impact on the State of Mis-
souri.86  Additionally, this understanding of the treaty power would enable 
the Senate to ratify any pending human rights treaties without having to 
attach “RUDs.”87 
There are, however, glaring problems with this textual analysis.  First, 
while it is true that the states delegated the treaty making power to the fed-
eral government, it does not mean that treaties do not have subject matter 
limitations.  Moreover, the federal government could circumvent constitu-
tional limitations by enacting treaties of unlimited scope, therefore making 
the Constitution a charade.88 
  
 84. Flaherty, supra n. 17, at 1306 (noting that nowhere in the Constitution does it say that treaties 
must relate solely to matters of “international” concern, as opposed matters of domestic concern). 
 85. Even though “nationalist” scholars think that treaties can be made on matters of serious domes-
tic concern, they nevertheless agree that treaties can only be made on subjects “appropriate for negotia-
tion and agreement among states.”  Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1090.  Professor Golove 
concedes that even though “international law may allow a state to enter into a treaty for any purpose it 
may have (subject to the principle of jus cogens), in my view, the President and Senate may not consti-
tutionally enter into a treaty for the sole purpose of making domestic legislation.”  Id. at n. 41.  In other 
words, treaties can be used domestically, pending they relate to matters of international concern.  Pro-
fessor Henkin also agrees with this point and formulated it as an equation: “A treaty is an international 
agreement on a matter of international concern. It may not deal with a matter which is not of interna-
tional concern; there is no matter which is of international concern with which it may not deal.”  Louis 
Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 903, 907 (1959) [hereinafter Henkin, Law of the Land].  Justice Field perhaps best summed 
up these views; holding that the treaty power “extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our 
government and the governments of other nations . . . [and] it is not perceived that there is any limit to 
the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation 
with a foreign country.”  Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 266-67. 
 86. Id.  “Nationalists” maintain that this treaty is valid, since the migratory bird issue is of interna-
tional concern.  See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 435 (describing the impact of these migratory birds on the 
United States and Canada). 
 87. See supra n. 85.  Domestic human rights treaties satisfy the international prong necessary in 
enacting a treaty because “the traditional conception of foreign affairs has changed to include matters 
formerly viewed as purely domestic issues.”  Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and 
Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1617, 1622 (1997). 
 88. The inimitable words of Professor Henry St. George Tucker make this point very well: 
 
If the establishment of an ‘unlimited’ treaty power is to be the ultimate conclusion of this 
great question, it must be admitted that the incorporation of the treaty-making power into 
the Constitution of the United States was the introduction into our governmental citadel of a 
Trojan horse, whose armored soldiery, for years concealed within it, now step forth armed 
cap-à-pie, shameless in their act of deception, eager and ready to capture the citadel upon 
which they pretended to bestow their gift.  If such construction be possible it would be of in-
terest to know for what purpose the Tenth Amendment was ever demanded and incorporated 
into the Constitution. 
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To recapitulate: superficially, the Constitutional text supports the “na-
tionalist” reading – but that reading withers under critical scrutiny.89  
Therefore, since the literal text of the treaty power is ambiguous, the next 
section examines the constitutional structure to discern whether there are 
any limitations on the scope of the treaty power. 
B. Constitutional Structure  
The Constitution’s procedural mechanisms support the “states’ rights” 
position that the Founders conceived of a treaty power that was limited in 
scope.90  First, the House of Representatives was excluded from treaty 
making.91  This effectively prevented the large states from dominating the 
smaller states in any treaty ratification debates.  Second, even in the Sen-
ate–where each state is represented equally–a super majority of two thirds 
is required to ratify a treaty.92  Both of these procedural mechanisms indi-
cate that the Founders did not intend the treaty power to usurp the power of 
the states; in other words, the Founding Fathers intended the treaty power 
to be limited to foreign affairs with minimal domestic influence.93 
Furthermore, it is indisputable that the Founders intended to set up a 
government of limited enumerated powers.94  If the treaty power is unlim-
  
Henry St. George Tucker, Limitations On The Treaty-Making Power Under The Constitution Of The 
United States § 296, 339 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1915). 
 89. Some commentators have critically scrutinized the Court’s decision in Reid.  According to 
Professor Golove and Mr. Deeken, the Tenth Amendment does not present any bar because the treaty 
power is entirely delegated.  At the same time, this does not mean that the treaty power is illimitable 
from violating other provisions of the Constitution.  Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1097; 
Deeken, supra n. 38, at 1010.  If this reading is correct then the questions presented above are an-
swered, because the treaty power is limited in scope.  This reading of Reid, however, fails for two 
reasons.  First, why is the rest of the Constitution any more sacrosanct than the Tenth Amendment?  
Second, Justice Black’s opinion in Reid must be considered in light of his judicial philosophy that 
consisted of an “overstated faith that the language of the Constitution would show the way.”  John Hart 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust 3 (Harvard U. Press 1980).  He also so eloquently said, “I cannot consider 
the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century ‘strait jacket.’ ”  Adamson v. Ca., 332 U.S. 46, 89 
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  So it would be farfetched to suggest that Justice Black did not take the 
Tenth Amendment seriously.  Although, it should be noted that this second rebuttal is somewhat weak-
ened, in that Justice Black did sign onto a nine-zero (New Deal) opinion, where the Court said that the 
Tenth Amendment is nothing “but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”  U.S. v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 90. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 411 (arguing that the “Founders contemplated that trea-
ties would govern truly inter-national relations”). 
 91. See supra n. 78 and accompanying text. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 411.  Additionally, until 1913 and the ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, Senators were elected by state legislatures.  This enabled the States to exert 
tremendous influence over the Senate, which provides further indication that the treaty power was 
never intended to be unlimited. 
 94. E.g. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (holding that “[t]he Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of [limited] enumerated powers . . . ‘the powers delegated . . . are few and defined’ ”). 
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ited in scope, it would in effect “permit amendment of [the Constitution] . . 
. in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.”95  This would be patently con-
trary to the Founders intent.96  This structural analysis is problematic be-
cause these inferences do not change the simple fact that the Constitution 
does not limit the scope of the treaty power.  Therefore, the next section 
scrutinizes the legislative history to determine whether there was an origi-
nal understanding of the treaty power inherent in the word “treaty.” 
C. Legislative History97 
By 1787, it became clear that the government created by the Articles of 
Confederation was ineffectively weak.98  A major impotency of the Arti-
cles was its inherent inability to force states to abide by treaties.99  For this 
and other reasons, a Constitutional Convention was called to form a 
stronger and “more perfect union.”100  “But the method for erecting a 
stronger national government was a point of great dispute.  While many 
delegates . . . wished to have a powerful central government, other dele-
gates . . . feared an oppressive central government that would undercut the 
power of the states.”101  The vibrant debate between state and federal 
power has raged since the Constitution’s founding,102 and it does not ap-
pear that this controversy will end in the near future.103 
At the Constitutional Convention, there was minimal debate–if any at 
all–regarding the scope of the treaty power or its impact on states’ rights.104  
The sheer paucity of debate on this topic indicates that there was no sub-
stantial disagreement between the “nationalistic” position and the “states’ 
  
 95. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The preceding notes on the legislative history, while certainly not exhaustive, nevertheless 
provide an inkling regarding the original understanding of the treaty power.  For a thorough and fasci-
nating historical discussion–albeit one partial to the “nationalist” view–see Golove’s, voluminous 240 
page article: Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12. 
 98. Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have 
You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. Dayton L. Rev. 5, 18-19 (1989). 
 99. Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1102. 
 100. U.S. Const. preamble. 
 101. Ehrman, supra n. 98, at 19. 
 102. See Slaughter-House Cases v. Crescent City, 83 U.S. 36, 60 (1872).  The issue of “states’ rights” 
came to a climax over slavery, and resulted with the Southern States seceding, which caused the Civil 
War. 
 103. Ironically, although the debate continues, the sides have switched.  The original Federalists, like 
Alexander Hamilton, were conservative and supporters of the English.  Yet today, although conserva-
tives remain pro-English, they nevertheless are strong supporters of “states’ rights.”  On the other hand, 
the original anti-Federalists, like Thomas Jefferson, were liberal supporters of the French.  Today, 
although still supporters of the French, they back a strong central government. 
 104. Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1134.  This is not to say that there was no debate relating 
to the treaty power.  If it was debated, it only concerned the procedural process necessary to enact a 
treaty.  Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 410. 
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rightists” position pertinent to the treaty power.105  Apparently, the Foun-
ders inherently understood the meaning of a treaty106 and did not see a con-
flict between states’ rights and treaties.  Perhaps this abeyance on the part 
of the “states’ rightists” was predicated on an accepted principle that the 
sine qua non of a treaty was to affect a change in foreign affairs without 
substantially limiting the states’ powers.107 
These issues were not discussed at the Constitutional Convention nor 
during the ratification debates of the states,108 the only exception was Vir-
ginia.109  This further supports the proposition that treaties and states’ 
rights were not seen as conflicting with one other because treaties were 
limited to the scope of foreign affairs.  For example, James Madison said, 
“[t]he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with the object of 
the delegation… The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with 
foreign nations, and is external.”110  Furthermore, Edmund Randolph said, 
“neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any 
state, can be affected by a treaty.”111  Thus, the treaty power in the Consti-
tution was originally understood as being limited in scope. 
The legislative history shows that the Founders understood treaties to 
affect foreign affairs and not to usurp the powers of the states.  Hence, 
Missouri was not decided in accordance with the original understanding of 
the treaty power, as the Migratory Bird Treaty substantially diminished 
Missouri’s regulatory powers.  Similarly, the original understanding of the 
treaty power prevents the Senate from ratifying treaties concerning domes-
tic human rights, as these treaties effectively impede on the states’ rights to 
individually regulate its citizens. 
  
 105. Henkin, Law of the Land, supra n. 85, at 906 (suggesting that perhaps no questions existed as to 
what a treaty is, and what is a proper subject for a treaty). 
 106. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand de-
scription [of obscenity]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when 
I see it . . . .”). 
 107. It would be a gross overstatement to say that the original scope of a treaty did not have any 
affect on the states.  From the founding of this Nation, treaties always affected the states to some de-
gree.  See e.g. Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 325 (1912) (concerning a treaty dealing with de-
ceased foreigners that affected California’s probate laws); Compagnie Francaise v. La., 186 U.S. 380, 
393-95 (1902) (involving a treaty regulating treatment of foreign nationals that affected Louisiana’s 
quarantine laws).  Nevertheless, the effect of treaties on the states was limited to the way a state treated 
its foreigners.  Henkin, Law of the Land, supra n. 85, at 910; but see Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 
12, at 1266-69 (arguing that not only was there never a subject matter limitation on treaties, but also 
that treaties were permitted to substantially affect the states).  The problem with Professor Golove’s 
analysis is that he cannot point to a single treaty prior to the Twentieth Century that regulated anything 
remotely resembling a human rights treaty that would, in effect, regulate a states own citizens. 
 108. See supra n. 104 and accompanying text. 
 109. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 410. 
 110. Id. at 413 (quoting Virginia’s ratification debates). 
 111. Id. 
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In summary, the constitutional text of the treaty power is unqualified 
and ostensibly enables the federal government to enact treaties of unlimited 
scope.  Yet the legislative history, supported by its constitutional structure, 
indicates that the Founders understood treaties as being inherently limited 
in scope to foreign affairs.112 
This contradiction is not insurmountable.  At the Founding there was 
no contradiction; treaties were universally understood to be limited in 
scope.  Hence, the constitutional text does not contradict the legislative 
history or constitutional structure.  The word “treaty” was embedded with 
meaning limiting its scope in consonance with the history and structure of 
the Constitution.113  The scope of the term “treaty”–shrouded with ambigu-
ity today–was not originally debated because the Founders thought it was a 
transparently simple term. 
The current controversy regarding the scope of the treaty power is 
therefore relatively new.  The argument arose when the meaning of 
“treaty” evolved to include agreements concerning domestic problems.114  
  
 112. Perhaps the most conclusive proof that treaties were understood to have an inherent subject 
matter limitation, is a statement from the most renowned of the “states’ rightists,” Senator John C. 
Calhoun. This venerable Southerner said: 
 
The limits of the [legislative power] are exactly marked; it was necessary, to prevent colli-
sion with similar co-existing States’ powers… Exact enumeration on this head is necessary, 
to prevent the most dangerous consequences. The enumeration of legislative powers in the 
constitution has relation, then, not to the treaty-making power, but to the powers of the 
States. In our relation to the rest of the world [however] the case is reversed. Here the States 
disappear. Divided within, we present the exterior of undivided sovereignty. . . . Whatever, 
then, concerns our foreign relations; whatever requires the consent of another nation, be-
longs to the treaty-making power. 
 
Golove, Treaty-Making, supra n. 12, at 1091 (quoting Calhoun).  It is inconceivable that Senator Cal-
houn would have made that statement, unless it was crystal clear that treaties were limited in scope to 
foreign affairs and could not be used to affect a state’s domestic affairs.  Curtis A. Bradley, Correspon-
dence: The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 98, 103 (2000) [herein-
after Bradley, Treaty Power Part II]. 
 113. Justice Black suggested another reason why the treaty power was left unlimited in the text. He 
said: “[T]he reason treaties were not limited to those made in ‘pursuance’ of the Constitution was so 
that agreements made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, including the important 
peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect.”  Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-
17.  Although, this explanation makes sense, it does not satisfactorily answer the aforementioned con-
tradiction.  It seems that the Founders–if they had so desired–could have conceived a usage of words 
that would have enabled the old treaties to remain in effect, while ensuring that new treaties would 
comply with the Constitution.  Professor Bradley suggests a third answer to this question; he says: “The 
Founders did not enumerate subject matter limitations on the treaty power in order to preserve flexibil-
ity, not because they thought the power unlimited.”  Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 417.  This 
answer is not much better because it creates a slippery slope, since there is no clearly demarcated treaty 
power. 
 114. Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, 176 (3d ed., Aspen 1999) (stating that 
the constitutional term “treaty” has come to include any international agreement, regardless of subject 
matter).  This change is something entirely alien to the original conception of the treaty power.  Brad-
ley, Treaty Power Part II, supra n. 112, at 121. 
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Consequently, the unqualified treaty power has been revised to comply 
with modern times.  This creates a contradiction between the constitutional 
text–now understood to be limitless in scope–and its structure and history – 
which are forces of limitation.115  If this thesis is correct, it certainly sheds 
light on the nature of Holmes’s soaring rhetoric in Missouri. 
We may add that when we are dealing with words that are also a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must 
realize that they have called into life a being the development of 
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted 
of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to hope that 
they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost 
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation.  The case before us must be considered in the light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hun-
dred years ago.  The treaty in question does not contravene any 
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.  The only ques-
tion is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment.  We must consider what 
this country has become in deciding what that amendment has re-
served.116 
Holmes bases his opinion on at least five factors: (1) the Founders 
could not foresee the world of today; (2) consideration of the Nation’s ex-
periences; (3) the understandings of yesteryear cannot resolve the current 
question; (4) consideration for the changed nature of the Nation; and, (5) 
the text of the constitution.  Holmes weakens the Founders’ understanding 
of the treaty power by reasoning that the Founders would have deemed the 
Migratory Bird Treaty unconstitutional.  For this reason, Holmes’ only 
grounds dating to the Founding is his fifth factor, the text of the constitu-
tion, which following Missouri, has been wrenched open to include even 
human rights treaties.117 
  
 115. Changed circumstances is an age-old problem inherent in the codification of law.  A classical 
example of this problem is a hypothetical statute passed in 1930 that says “no vehicles in the park.”  
Clearly, the statute prohibits cars, but does it include a child’s remote controlled car, does it include a 
motorized wheelchair?  Since these objects did not exist at the time of the statute’s passage it is unclear 
whether they are included in the prohibition. 
 116. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433-34 (emphasis added). 
 117. See supra n. 115.  The problem confronted by Holmes is not new.  Constitutions, like all docu-
ments, are dated and are most applicable at the moment in time when enacted, and are not designed to 
last forever.  Yet, it is worth considering Justice Cardozo’s enduring words regarding the nature of 
constitutions: 
 
The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, 
the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and deri-
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IV.  TREATY POWER AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
This article has endeavored to show that the original meaning of the 
word “treaty” only included agreements between nations that would not 
substantially affect the domestic regulatory powers of the states.  Assum-
ing there is no subject matter restriction on the treaty power, is the treaty 
power unlimited?  Does the Tenth Amendment play a role in constraining 
the treaty power?118  These questions are particularly relevant because the 
Court has reinvigorated its federalism jurisprudence.  The Tenth Amend-
ment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”119  Not surprisingly, the “nationalists” and “states’ 
rightists” disagree as to whether the Tenth Amendment constrains the 
treaty power.120  Justice Holmes enunciated the prevailing “nationalist” 
view in Missouri.121  He explained that the Tenth Amendment does not 
limit the treaty power; it is entirely “delegated” to the federal govern-
ment.122 
If the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal government from imped-
ing on a state’s reserved powers, why should the treaty power be impervi-
ous to the Tenth Amendment?  The same Court that decided Missouri held 
that the Tenth Amendment constrained the uninhibited use of the Com-
merce Clause.123  If so, why should the treaty power be more immune from 
the Tenth Amendment than the Commerce Clause?124  Hence, the “states’ 
rightists” faction argues that the Migratory Bird Treaty was unconstitu-
  
sion of those who have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in constitu-
tions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a body of defenders. 
 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 92-93 (Yale U. Press 1921).  For a fascinat-
ing discussion regarding Holmes’s theory of judicial review, see John Dewey, Logical Method and 
Law, 10 Cornell L. Rev. 17, 19-22 (1924-1925). 
 118. See supra n. 47. 
 119. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
 120. See e.g. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36 (expositing the “states’ rights” position); contra, 
Flaherty, supra n. 17 (espousing the “nationalist” position). 
 121. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 434. 
 122. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432. 
 123. See supra n. 45 (discussing Hammer v. Dagenhart; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 
(1907) (sustaining Colorado’s claim that Congress lacked the power to regulate its use of rivers for the 
purpose of reclamation of arid lands)).  It should be noted that Justice Holmes dissented in Hammer, 
leading some to suggest that perhaps Holmes did not view the Tenth Amendment as a barrier.  Bradley, 
Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at n. 261.  The majority of the Court signed onto both cases implying that 
the Tenth Amendment only limits the commerce power, but not the treaty power. 
 124. Bradley, Treaty Power, supra n. 36, at 434. 
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tional because it inhibited Missouri’s exercise of its reserved powers.125  
Accordingly, the “states’ rightists” faction maintains that the Tenth 
Amendment prevents all federal encroachment on states’ rights, notwith-
standing “delegated” federal infringement. 
The “states’ rightists” view is problematic, however, because it is 
predicated on a dynamic that no longer exists.  In 1791, the Tenth 
Amendment made sense.  At that time, a federal government of limited and 
enumerated powers could conceivably co-exist beside a state government 
without substantially imposing on the state’s affairs.126  Today, the original 
demarcation line between state and federal is illusory.  As the United 
States continues to globalize, the national economy engenders extensive 
federal and state interdependency.127  These factors cause even the permit-
ted exercise of federal power to seriously affect the reserved powers of a 
state.128  Thus, current reality creates an awkward constitutional incongru-
ity.  If the permitted regulation of commerce impacts a state’s reserved 
powers, then the enumerated powers of the Constitution are at odds with 
the Tenth Amendment’s reserved powers.  Consequently, the Commerce 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment must not be given its full effect to avoid 
this predicament. 
Unfortunately for the “states’ rightists” there is blackletter law dealing 
with the conflict between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amend-
ment.  The Court has repeatedly held that the Tenth Amendment only re-
serves non-delegated powers to the states.129  However, “[i]f a power is 
delegated . . . the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of 
that power to the States.”130  “The Tenth Amendment imposes no restric-
tion on the exercise of delegated powers.”131  Therefore, Congress can in-
fringe on the states’ reserved powers pursuant to the scope of its own dele-
  
 125. Holmes argued–to use popular parlance–that the birds are “here today and gone tomorrow.”  
This ostensibly weakens Missouri’s claim, as they cannot really regulate a transitory creature.  Mis-
souri, 252 U.S. at 434-35. 
 126. “All legislative power must be vested in either the state or the National Government; no legisla-
tive powers belong to a state government other than those which affect solely the internal affairs of that 
State; consequently all powers which are national in their scope must be found vested in the Con-
gress.”  Kansas, 206 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).  Logically this makes sense, because how could the 
Tenth Amendment reserve powers solely for the state, if, at ratification, state powers were intertwined 
with federal powers? 
 127. Friedman, supra n. 23, at 1447-65 (discussing globalization’s impact on federalism). 
 128. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 156 (In the words of Justice O’Connor: “As interstate commerce has become 
ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, 
and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’ commerce power.”). 
 129. E.g. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (explaining the nature of the non-
delegated powers and the reasons why they were reserved to the states). 
 130. N.Y., 504 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). 
 131. Printz, 521 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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gated powers.132  This means that Missouri was correctly decided in rela-
tion to the Tenth Amendment question.133  Accordingly, if Congress ad-
heres to the scope of the treaty power, the Tenth Amendment poses no 
problem – even if the treaty has a substantial impact upon the reserved 
powers of the state.  The Court, however, rejected this Tenth Amendment 
approach in its recent jurisprudence.134  The Court insisted that there are 
non-scope based limits to Congress’ “delegated” powers.135  The obvious 
problem is how can a “delegated” power be limited if the Tenth Amend-
ment is not implicated? 
The answer is that the Tenth Amendment is not the means being used 
to limit the “delegated” power.  Rather there is an inviolable state sover-
eignty that prevents Congress from “commandeering” both state legisla-
tures136 and state executives.137  Hence, there are now three limitations on 
Congress: (1) scope; (2) state sovereignty;138 and (3) the Tenth Amend-
ment. 
These rulings are part of a recent trend that restricts Congress’ right of 
action.139  Many scholars have roundly criticized these decisions.140  The 
fundamental problem with the Court’s ruling is that the Constitution does 
not create a right of state sovereignty.141  The Court unilaterally created 
this right by looking to constitutional history, structure, and its own juris-
  
 132. See supra n. 47.  The issue of the scope of delegation must be kept analytically separate from the 
inquiry regarding the Tenth Amendment.  The reason is that, at times, the scope of the delegation will 
inherently limit the exercise of the delegated power, even though the Tenth Amendment is irrelevant.  
See supra pt. II.  Perhaps, for this reason, Justice Thomas has been advocating a reexamination of the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585. 
 133. Note that this section is assuming arguendo that the Migratory Bird Treaty did not violate the 
scope of the treaty power.  See supra nn. 47, 118 and accompanying text.  Hence, Holmes’s decision is 
not problematic, as Congress was acting within the scope of the treaty power. 
 134. See e.g. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (disagreeing with the dissents’ view of the Tenth Amendment). 
 135. Id. at 905, 935 (explaining that state sovereignty prevents congressional action, while conceding 
that the Tenth Amendment is irrelevant to the inquiry). 
 136. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” prevents Congress 
from exercising its commerce power to coerce a state’s legislature). 
 137. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; N.Y., 505 U.S. at 188 (extending the holding to a state’s executive 
branch). 
 138. Ironically, the Court’s view of the Tenth Amendment has remained consistent.  In Darby, the 
Court held that the Tenth Amendment is “but a truism.”  312 U.S. at 124; see also supra n. 89.  While 
in N.Y., the Court held that the Tenth Amendment is “essentially a tautology.”  505 U.S. at 157.  The 
only difference is that, in Darby, the impotence of the Tenth Amendment led to the constitutionality of 
the New Deal, whereas, in N.Y., it led to the unconstitutionality of congressional action. 
 139. See e.g. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (prohibiting Congress from subjecting non-
consenting states to suit within the state’s own court); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(holding that Congress cannot expand rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (restricting congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity). 
 140. See e.g. Flaherty, supra n. 17 (calling the Court’s federalism jurisprudence “a wasting force in 
U.S. life”). 
 141. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
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prudence.142  This article is not concerned with the propriety of the Court’s 
actions; it merely asks whether the anti-commandeering principle affects 
the treaty power.143 
It is probable that the Court will apply its anti-commandeering princi-
ple to the treaty power if Missouri is reexamined.  This theory is based 
upon two factors.  First, the Court in Printz made clear that commandeer-
ing a state’s apparatus is “fundamentally incompatible with our constitu-
tional system of dual sovereignty.”144  Accordingly, since the Commerce 
Clause cannot be used to commandeer state action, neither can the treaty 
power.  Second, the Court has presumed “that no anomalous and unheard-
of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the Constitu-
tion.”145  It would be anomalous to allow commandeering under the treaty 
power and not under the commerce power.  Logically, the Court must 
broaden its anti-commandeering holding or foster an anomalous result.  
These two reasons suggest that the Court will extend the anti-
commandeering principle to the treaty power, if it reexamines Missouri. 
Nevertheless, it is not a foregone conclusion that a Missouri type treaty 
or a human rights treaty would be deemed unconstitutional.  The uncer-
tainty is caused by the elusiveness of the word commandeering.  For ex-
ample, if Congress commands a state to perform function A, it could be 
said with certainty that Congress is commandeering.  Hence, commanding 
a state to give the federal government information, as stipulated in the Pa-
triot Act, would be unconstitutional commandeering.146  But, what happens 
if Congress merely tells a state not perform function A – is that comman-
deering?  The answer is unclear.147  Therefore, if passive commandeering 
is constitutional, the federal government can ratify a human rights treaty 
forbidding states from carrying out the death penalty. 
  
 142. Id. (explaining that since “there is no constitutional text [in the Tenth Amendment] speaking to 
the precise question, the answer . . . must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the 
structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court”).  It would not be farfetched to say 
that Printz and N.Y. are Griswold type decisions.  In Griswold the Court created a constitutional “right 
to privacy” from the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights.  Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 
(1965). 
 143. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; N.Y., 505 U.S. at 188. 
 144. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 145. Alden, 527 U.S. at 727.  Alden reinvigorated the original anomalous holding presented in Hans, 
134 U.S. at 18. Both cases extend a constitutional ruling to an open constitutional question, solely to 
prevent an anomalous result. 
 146. See supra n. 8. 
 147. “Do the principles articulated in N.Y. and Printz support a distinction between compelled action 
and compelled inaction?”  Geoffrey R. Stone et. al., Constitutional Law ch. II, 252 (4th ed., Aspen L. & 
Bus. 2001). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract categories.  They do 
not fall from the sky; nor are they pulled out of it.  They have a 
specific juridical origin and etiology.  They derive meaning and 
content from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the 
purposes they were designed to serve.  To these they are bound as 
is a live tree to its roots. . . .  They cannot be wrenched from it and 
mechanically transplanted into an alien, unrelated context without 
suffering mutilation or distortion.148 
And yet although: 
Many will have deep sympathy for those who dream of old days 
thought good, or better; who yearn for decentralization even in for-
eign affairs and matters of international concern, for limitations on 
federal power, for increase in the importance of the States; who 
thrill to a wild, poignant, romantic wish to turn back all the clocks, 
to unlearn the learnings, until the atom is unsplit, weapons un-
forged, oceans unnarrowed, the Civil War unfought.149 
Nevertheless: 
[Their] wish remains idle, and the effort to diminish power in this 
area for fear that it may not be used wisely is quixotic, if not suici-
dal.  It is not the moment to attempt it when all ability, flexibility, 
[and] wisdom are needed for cooperation for survival by a fright-
ened race, on a diminishing earth . . . .150 
  
 148. Reid, 354 U.S. at 50 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 149. Henkin, Law of the Land, supra n. 85, at 936. 
 150. Id. 
